Context profiling for malware detection

ABSTRACT

Analysis of samples for maliciousness is disclosed. A sample is executed and one or more network activities associated with executing the sample are recorded. The recorded network activities are compared to a malware profile. The malware profile comprises a set of network activities taken by a known malicious application during execution of the known malicious application. A verdict of “malicious” is assigned to the sample based at least in part on a determination that the recorded network activities match the malware profile.

CROSS REFERENCE TO OTHER APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.16/926,415, entitled CONTEXT PROFILING FOR MALWARE DETECTION filed Jul.10, 2020, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/885,393, now U.S. Pat. No. 10,764,309, entitled CONTEXT PROFILING FORMALWARE DETECTION filed Jan. 31, 2018, all of which is incorporatedherein by reference for all purposes.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Malware is a general term commonly used to refer to malicious software(e.g., including a variety of hostile, intrusive, and/or otherwiseunwanted software). Malware can be in the form of code, scripts, activecontent, and/or other software. Example uses of malware includedisrupting computer and/or network operations, stealing proprietaryinformation (e.g., confidential information, such as identity,financial, and/or intellectual property related information), and/orgaining access to private/proprietary computer systems and/or computernetworks. Unfortunately, as techniques are developed to help detect andmitigate malware, nefarious authors find ways to circumvent suchefforts. Accordingly, there is an ongoing need for improvements totechniques for identifying and mitigating malware.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Various embodiments of the invention are disclosed in the followingdetailed description and the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 1 illustrates an example of an environment in which maliciousapplications (“malware”) are detected and prevented from causing harm.

FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment of a data appliance.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example of logical components that can be includedin a system for analyzing samples.

FIGS. 4A-4C illustrate examples of malware profiles.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a process for building a malwareprofile.

FIG. 6 illustrates an example of a process for determining whether asample is malicious.

FIG. 7A illustrates an event sequence of data logged by a dataappliance.

FIG. 7B depicts a representation of the event sequence shown in FIG. 7A.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example of a process for using a malware profileto identify a compromised host.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The invention can be implemented in numerous ways, including as aprocess; an apparatus; a system; a composition of matter; a computerprogram product embodied on a computer readable storage medium; and/or aprocessor, such as a processor configured to execute instructions storedon and/or provided by a memory coupled to the processor. In thisspecification, these implementations, or any other form that theinvention may take, may be referred to as techniques. In general, theorder of the steps of disclosed processes may be altered within thescope of the invention. Unless stated otherwise, a component such as aprocessor or a memory described as being configured to perform a taskmay be implemented as a general component that is temporarily configuredto perform the task at a given time or a specific component that ismanufactured to perform the task. As used herein, the term ‘processor’refers to one or more devices, circuits, and/or processing coresconfigured to process data, such as computer program instructions.

A detailed description of one or more embodiments of the invention isprovided below along with accompanying figures that illustrate theprinciples of the invention. The invention is described in connectionwith such embodiments, but the invention is not limited to anyembodiment. The scope of the invention is limited only by the claims andthe invention encompasses numerous alternatives, modifications andequivalents. Numerous specific details are set forth in the followingdescription in order to provide a thorough understanding of theinvention. These details are provided for the purpose of example and theinvention may be practiced according to the claims without some or allof these specific details. For the purpose of clarity, technicalmaterial that is known in the technical fields related to the inventionhas not been described in detail so that the invention is notunnecessarily obscured.

A firewall generally protects networks from unauthorized access whilepermitting authorized communications to pass through the firewall. Afirewall is typically a device, a set of devices, or software executedon a device that provides a firewall function for network access. Forexample, a firewall can be integrated into operating systems of devices(e.g., computers, smart phones, or other types of network communicationcapable devices). A firewall can also be integrated into or executed asone or more software applications on various types of devices, such ascomputer servers, gateways, network/routing devices (e.g., networkrouters), and data appliances (e.g., security appliances or other typesof special purpose devices), and in various implementations, certainoperations can be implemented in special purpose hardware, such as anASIC or FPGA.

Firewalls typically deny or permit network transmission based on a setof rules. These sets of rules are often referred to as policies (e.g.,network policies or network security policies). For example, a firewallcan filter inbound traffic by applying a set of rules or policies toprevent unwanted outside traffic from reaching protected devices. Afirewall can also filter outbound traffic by applying a set of rules orpolicies (e.g., allow, block, monitor, notify or log, and/or otheractions can be specified in firewall rules or firewall policies, whichcan be triggered based on various criteria, such as are describedherein). A firewall can also filter local network (e.g., intranet)traffic by similarly applying a set of rules or policies.

Security devices (e.g., security appliances, security gateways, securityservices, and/or other security devices) can include various securityfunctions (e.g., firewall, anti-malware, intrusion prevention/detection,Data Loss Prevention (DLP), and/or other security functions), networkingfunctions (e.g., routing, Quality of Service (QoS), workload balancingof network related resources, and/or other networking functions), and/orother functions. For example, routing functions can be based on sourceinformation (e.g., IP address and port), destination information (e.g.,IP address and port), and protocol information.

A basic packet filtering firewall filters network communication trafficby inspecting individual packets transmitted over a network (e.g.,packet filtering firewalls or first generation firewalls, which arestateless packet filtering firewalls). Stateless packet filteringfirewalls typically inspect the individual packets themselves and applyrules based on the inspected packets (e.g., using a combination of apacket's source and destination address information, protocolinformation, and a port number).

Application firewalls can also perform application layer filtering(e.g., application layer filtering firewalls or second generationfirewalls, which work on the application level of the TCP/IP stack).Application layer filtering firewalls or application firewalls cangenerally identify certain applications and protocols (e.g., webbrowsing using HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), a Domain Name System(DNS) request, a file transfer using File Transfer Protocol (FTP), andvarious other types of applications and other protocols, such as Telnet,DHCP, TCP, UDP, and TFTP (GSS)). For example, application firewalls canblock unauthorized protocols that attempt to communicate over a standardport (e.g., an unauthorized/out of policy protocol attempting to sneakthrough by using a non-standard port for that protocol can generally beidentified using application firewalls).

Stateful firewalls can also perform state-based packet inspection inwhich each packet is examined within the context of a series of packetsassociated with that network transmission's flow of packets. Thisfirewall technique is generally referred to as a stateful packetinspection as it maintains records of all connections passing throughthe firewall and is able to determine whether a packet is the start of anew connection, a part of an existing connection, or is an invalidpacket. For example, the state of a connection can itself be one of thecriteria that triggers a rule within a policy.

Advanced or next generation firewalls can perform stateless and statefulpacket filtering and application layer filtering as discussed above.Next generation firewalls can also perform additional firewalltechniques. For example, certain newer firewalls sometimes referred toas advanced or next generation firewalls can also identify users andcontent (e.g., next generation firewalls). In particular, certain nextgeneration firewalls are expanding the list of applications that thesefirewalls can automatically identify to thousands of applications.Examples of such next generation firewalls are commercially availablefrom Palo Alto Networks, Inc. (e.g., Palo Alto Networks' PA Seriesfirewalls). For example, Palo Alto Networks' next generation firewallsenable enterprises to identify and control applications, users, andcontent—not just ports, IP addresses, and packets—using variousidentification technologies, such as the following: APP-ID for accurateapplication identification, User-ID for user identification (e.g., byuser or user group), and Content-ID for real-time content scanning(e.g., controlling web surfing and limiting data and file transfers).These identification technologies allow enterprises to securely enableapplication usage using business-relevant concepts, instead of followingthe traditional approach offered by traditional port-blocking firewalls.Also, special purpose hardware for next generation firewalls(implemented, for example, as dedicated appliances) generally providehigher performance levels for application inspection than softwareexecuted on general purpose hardware (e.g., such as security appliancesprovided by Palo Alto Networks, Inc., which use dedicated, functionspecific processing that is tightly integrated with a single-passsoftware engine to maximize network throughput while minimizinglatency).

Advanced or next generation firewalls can also be implemented usingvirtualized firewalls. Examples of such next generation firewalls arecommercially available from Palo Alto Networks, Inc. (e.g., Palo AltoNetworks' VM Series firewalls, which support various commercialvirtualized environments, including, for example, VMware® ESXi™ andNSX™, Citrix® Netscaler SDX™, KVM/OpenStack (Centos/RHEL, Ubuntu®), andAMAZON Web Services (AWS)). For example, virtualized firewalls cansupport similar or the exact same next-generation firewall and advancedthreat prevention features available in physical form factor appliances,allowing enterprises to safely enable applications flowing into, andacross their private, public, and hybrid cloud computing environments.Automation features such as VM monitoring, dynamic address groups, and aREST-based API allow enterprises to proactively monitor VM changesdynamically feeding that context into security policies, therebyeliminating the policy lag that may occur when VMs change.

FIG. 1 illustrates an example of an environment in which maliciousapplications (“malware”) are detected and prevented from causing harm.As will be described in more detail below, malware classifications(e.g., as made by security platform 122) can be variously shared and/orrefined among various entities included in the environment shown in FIG.1 . And, using techniques described herein, devices, such as endpointclient devices 104-110 can be protected from such malware.

The term “application” is used throughout the Specification tocollectively refer to programs, bundles of programs, manifests,packages, etc., irrespective of form/platform. An “application” (alsoreferred to herein as a “sample”) can be a standalone file (e.g., acalculator application having the filename “calculator.apk” or“calculator.exe”) and can also be an independent component of anotherapplication (e.g., a mobile advertisement SDK or library embedded withinthe calculator app).

“Malware” as used herein refers to an application that engages inbehaviors, whether clandestinely or not (and whether illegal or not), ofwhich a user does not approve/would not approve if fully informed.Examples of malware include Trojans, viruses, rootkits, spyware, hackingtools, keyloggers, etc. One example of malware is a desktop applicationthat collects and reports to a remote server the end user's location(but does not provide the user with location-based services, such as amapping service). Another example of malware is a malicious ANDROIDApplication Package .apk (APK) file that appears to an end user to be afree game, but stealthily sends SMS premium messages (e.g., costing $10each), running up the end user's phone bill. Another example of malwareis an APPLE iOS flashlight application that stealthily collects theuser's contacts and sends those contacts to a spammer. Other forms ofmalware can also be detected/thwarted using the techniques describedherein (e.g., ransomware). Further, while “malware profiles” aredescribed herein as being generated for malicious applications,techniques described herein can also be used in various embodiments togenerate profiles for other kinds of applications (e.g., adwareprofiles, goodware profiles, etc.).

Techniques described herein can be used in conjunction with a variety ofplatforms (e.g., desktops, mobile devices, gaming platforms, embeddedsystems, etc.) and/or a variety of types of applications (e.g., ANDROID.apk files, iOS applications, WINDOWS PE files, Adobe Acrobat PDF files,etc.). In the example environment shown in FIG. 1 , client devices104-108 are a laptop computer, a desktop computer, and a tablet(respectively) present in an enterprise network 140. Client device 110is a laptop computer present outside of enterprise network 140.

Data appliance 102 is configured to enforce policies regardingcommunications between client devices, such as client devices 104 and106, and nodes outside of enterprise network 140 (e.g., reachable viaexternal network 118). Examples of such policies include ones governingtraffic shaping, quality of service, and routing of traffic. Otherexamples of policies include security policies such as ones requiringthe scanning for threats in incoming (and/or outgoing) emailattachments, website content, files exchanged through instant messagingprograms, and/or other file transfers. In some embodiments, dataappliance 102 is also configured to enforce policies with respect totraffic that stays within enterprise network 140.

An embodiment of a data appliance is shown in FIG. 2 . The example shownis a representation of physical components that are included in dataappliance 102, in various embodiments. Specifically, data appliance 102includes a high performance multi-core CPU 202 and RAM 204. Dataappliance 102 also includes a storage 210 (such as one or more harddisks), which is used to store policy and other configurationinformation, as well as other information such as URL categorizationinformation and malware profiles. Data appliance 102 can also includeone or more optional hardware accelerators. For example, data appliance102 can include a cryptographic engine 206 configured to performencryption and decryption operations, and one or more FPGAs 208configured to perform matching, act as network processors, and/orperform other tasks.

Data appliance 102 can take a variety of forms. For example, dataappliance 102 can comprise a dedicated device or set of devices. Thefunctionality provided by data appliance 102 can also be integrated intoor executed as software on a general purpose computer, a computerserver, a gateway, and/or a network/routing device. In some embodiments,services provided by data appliance 102 are instead (or in addition)provided to a client device (e.g., client device 104) by softwareexecuting on the client device.

Whenever data appliance 102 is described as performing a task, a singlecomponent, a subset of components, or all components of data appliance102 may cooperate to perform the task. Similarly, whenever a componentof data appliance 102 is described as performing a task, a subcomponentmay perform the task and/or the component may perform the task inconjunction with other components. In various embodiments, portions ofdata appliance 102 are provided by one or more third parties. Dependingon factors such as the amount of computing resources available to dataappliance 102, various logical components and/or features of dataappliance 102 may be omitted and the techniques described herein adaptedaccordingly. Similarly, additional logical components/features can beincluded in embodiments of data appliance 102 as applicable.

In the example shown in FIG. 1 , a malicious individual (using system120) has created malware 130. The malicious individual hopes that aclient device, such as client device 104, will execute a copy of malware130, compromising the client device, and causing the client device tobecome a bot in a botnet. The compromised client device can then beinstructed to perform tasks (e.g., cryptocurrency mining, orparticipating in denial of service attacks) and to report information toan external entity, such as command and control (C&C) server 150, aswell as to receive instructions from C&C server 150, as applicable.

Suppose data appliance 102 has intercepted an email sent (e.g., bysystem 120) to client device 104 to which a copy of malware 130 has beenattached. As an alternate, but similar scenario, data appliance 102could intercept an attempted download by client device 104 of malware130 (e.g., from a website). In either scenario, data appliance 102determines whether a signature for the file (e.g., the email attachmentor website download of malware 130) is present on data appliance 102. Asignature, if present, can indicate that a file is known to be safe(e.g., is whitelisted), and can also indicate that the file is known tobe malicious (e.g., is blacklisted).

In various embodiments, data appliance 102 is configured to work incooperation with security platform 122. As one example, securityplatform 122 can provide to data appliance 102 a set of signatures ofknown-malicious files (e.g., as part of a subscription). If a signaturefor malware 130 is included in the set (e.g., an MD5 hash of malware130), data appliance 102 can prevent the transmission of malware 130 toclient device 104 accordingly (e.g., by detecting that an MD5 hash ofthe email attachment sent to client device 104 matches the MD5 hash ofmalware 130). Security platform 122 can also provide to data appliance102 a list of known malicious domains and/or IP addresses, allowing dataappliance 102 to block traffic between enterprise network 140 and C&Cserver 150 (e.g., where C&C server 150 is known to be malicious). Thelist of malicious domains (and/or IP addresses) can also help dataappliance 102 determine when one of its nodes has been compromised. Forexample, if client device 104 attempts to contact C&C server 150, suchattempt is a strong indicator that client 104 has been compromised bymalware (and remedial actions should be taken accordingly, such asquarantining client device 104 from communicating with other nodeswithin enterprise network 140).

If no signature for an attachment is found, in various embodiments, dataappliance 102 is configured to provide the file for static/dynamicanalysis, to determine whether it is malicious and/or to otherwiseclassify it. As one example, data appliance 102 can send a copy ofmalware 130 to security platform 122 for analysis. Security platform 122can also (or instead) obtain copies of applications for evaluation fromsources other than data appliance 102 (e.g., data appliances 136 and/or148). In various embodiments, analysis of malware 130 is performed atleast partially on premise (e.g., within enterprise network 140). Forexample, analysis described herein as being performed by securityplatform 122 can also be performed by a malware analysis module 112included in data appliance 102.

Security platform 122 stores copies of received samples in storage 142and analysis is commenced (or scheduled, as applicable). One example ofstorage 142 is an Apache Hadoop Cluster (HDFS). Results of analysis (andadditional information pertaining to the applications) are stored indatabase 146. In the event an application is determined to be malicious,data appliance 102 can be configured to automatically block the filedownload based on the analysis result. Further, a signature can begenerated for the malware and distributed (e.g., to other dataappliances such as data appliances 136 and 148) to automatically blockfuture file transfer requests to download the file determined to bemalicious.

In various embodiments, security platform 122 comprises one or morededicated commercially available hardware servers (e.g., havingmulti-core processor(s), 8G+ of RAM, gigabit network interfaceadaptor(s), and hard drive(s)) running typical server-class operatingsystems (e.g., Linux). Security platform 122 can be implemented across ascalable infrastructure comprising multiple such servers, solid statedrives, and/or other applicable high-performance hardware. Securityplatform 122 can comprise several distributed components, includingcomponents provided by one or more third parties. For example, portionsor all of security platform 122 can be implemented using the AMAZONElastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and/or AMAZON Simple Storage Service (S3).Further, as with data appliance 102, whenever security platform 122 isreferred to as performing a task, such as storing data or processingdata, it is to be understood that a sub-component or multiplesub-components of security platform 122 (whether individually or incooperation with third party components) may cooperate to perform thattask. As one example, security platform 122 can optionally performstatic/dynamic analysis in cooperation with one or more virtual machine(VM) servers, such as VM server 124.

An example of a virtual machine server is a physical machine comprisingcommercially available server-class hardware (e.g., a multi-coreprocessor, 4+ Gigabytes of RAM, and one or more Gigabit networkinterface adapters) that runs commercially available virtualizationsoftware, such as VMware ESXi, Citrix XenServer, or MICROSOFT Hyper-V.In some embodiments, the virtual machine server is omitted. Further, avirtual machine server may be under the control of the same entity thatadministers security platform 122, but may also be provided by a thirdparty. As one example, the virtual machine server can rely on EC2, withthe remainder portions of security platform 122 provided by dedicatedhardware owned by and under the control of the operator of securityplatform 122. VM server 124 is configured to provide one or more virtualmachines 126-128 for emulating client devices. The virtual machines canexecute a variety of operating systems and/or versions thereof. Observedbehaviors resulting from executing applications in the virtual machinesare logged and analyzed (e.g., for indications that the application ismalicious). In some embodiments, log analysis is performed by the VMserver (e.g., VM server 124). In other embodiments, analysis isperformed at least in part by other components of security platform 122,such as a coordinator 144.

In various embodiments, security platform 122 makes available theresults of its analysis of samples via a list of signatures (and/orother identifiers) to data appliance 102 as part of a subscription. Forexample, security platform 122 can periodically send a content packagethat identifies malware apps (e.g., daily, hourly, or some otherinterval, and/or based on an event configured by one or more policies).An example content package includes a listing of identified malwareapps, with information such as a package name, a hash value for uniquelyidentifying the app, and a malware name (and/or malware family name) foreach identified malware app. The subscription can cover the analysis ofjust those files intercepted by data appliance 102 and sent to securityplatform 122 by data appliance 102, and can also cover signatures of allmalware known to security platform 122 (or subsets thereof, such as justmobile malware but not other forms of malware (e.g., PDF malware)).

In various embodiments, security platform 122 is configured to providesecurity services to a variety of entities in addition to (or, asapplicable, instead of) an operator of data appliance 102. For example,other enterprises, having their own respective enterprise networks 114and 116, and their own respective data appliances 136 and 148, cancontract with the operator of security platform 122. Other types ofentities can also make use of the services of security platform 122. Forexample, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) providing Internet serviceto client device 110 can contract with security platform 122 to analyzeapplications which client device 110 attempts to download. As anotherexample, the owner of client device 110 can install software on clientdevice 110 that communicates with security platform 122 (e.g., toreceive content packages from security platform 122 and transmitapplications to security platform 122 for analysis).

Analyzing Samples Using Static/Dynamic Analysis

FIG. 3 illustrates an example of logical components that can be includedin a system for analyzing samples. Analysis system 300 can beimplemented using a single device. For example, the functionality ofanalysis system 300 can be implemented in a malware analysis module 112incorporated into data appliance 102. Analysis system 300 can also beimplemented, collectively, across multiple distinct devices. Forexample, the functionality of analysis system 300 can be provided bysecurity platform 122.

In various embodiments, analysis system 300 makes use of lists,databases, or other collections of known safe content and/or known badcontent (collectively shown in FIG. 3 as collection 314). Collection 314can be obtained in a variety of ways, including via a subscriptionservice (e.g., provided by a third party) and/or as a result of otherprocessing (e.g., performed by data appliance 102 and/or securityplatform 122). Examples of information included in collection 314 are:URLs, domain names, and/or IP addresses of known malicious servers;URLs, domain names, and/or IP addresses of known safe servers; URLs,domain names, and/or IP addresses of known command and control (C&C)domains; signatures, hashes, and/or other identifiers of known maliciousapplications; signatures, hashes, and/or other identifiers of known safeapplications; signatures, hashes, and/or other identifiers of knownmalicious files (e.g., ANDROID exploit files); signatures, hashes,and/or other identifiers of known safe libraries; and signatures,hashes, and/or other identifiers of known malicious libraries.

Ingestion

In various embodiments, when a new sample is received for analysis(e.g., an existing signature associated with the sample is not presentin analysis system 300), it is added to queue 302. As shown in FIG. 3 ,application 130 is received by system 300 and added to queue 302.

Static Analysis

Coordinator 304 monitors queue 302, and as resources (e.g., a staticanalysis worker) become available, coordinator 304 fetches a sample fromqueue 302 for processing (e.g., fetches a copy of malware 130). Inparticular, coordinator 304 first provides the sample to static analysisengine 306 for static analysis. In some embodiments, one or more staticanalysis engines are included within analysis system 300, where analysissystem 300 is a single device. In other embodiments, static analysis isperformed by a separate static analysis server that includes a pluralityof workers (i.e., a plurality of instances of static analysis engine306).

The static analysis engine obtains general information about the sample,and includes it (along with heuristic and other information, asapplicable) in a static analysis report 308. The report can be createdby the static analysis engine, or by coordinator 304 (or by anotherappropriate component) which can be configured to receive theinformation from static analysis engine 306. In some embodiments, thecollected information is stored in a database record for the sample(e.g., in database 316), instead of or in addition to a separate staticanalysis report 308 being created (i.e., portions of the database recordform the report 308). In some embodiments, the static analysis enginealso forms a verdict with respect to the application (e.g., “safe,”“suspicious,” or “malicious”). As one example, the verdict can be“malicious” if even one “malicious” static feature is present in theapplication (e.g., the application includes a hard link to a knownmalicious domain). As another example, points can be assigned to each ofthe features (e.g., based on severity if found; based on how reliablethe feature is for predicting malice; etc.) and a verdict can beassigned by static analysis engine 306 (or coordinator 304, ifapplicable) based on the number of points associated with the staticanalysis results.

Dynamic Analysis

Once static analysis is completed, coordinator 304 locates an availabledynamic analysis engine 310 to perform dynamic analysis on theapplication. As with static analysis engine 306, analysis system 300 caninclude one or more dynamic analysis engines directly. In otherembodiments, dynamic analysis is performed by a separate dynamicanalysis server that includes a plurality of workers (i.e., a pluralityof instances of dynamic analysis engine 310).

Each dynamic analysis worker manages a virtual machine instance. In someembodiments, results of static analysis (e.g., performed by staticanalysis engine 306), whether in report form (308) and/or as stored indatabase 316, or otherwise stored, are provided as input to dynamicanalysis engine 310. For example, the static report information can beused to help select/customize the virtual machine instance used bydynamic analysis engine 310 (e.g., MICROSOFT XP SP 3 vs. WINDOWS 7 SP 2,or iOS 9.0 vs. iOS 10.0). Where multiple virtual machine instances areexecuted at the same time, a single dynamic analysis engine can manageall of the instances, or multiple dynamic analysis engines can be used(e.g., with each managing its own virtual machine instance), asapplicable. As will be explained in more detail below, during thedynamic portion of the analysis, actions taken by the application(including network activity) are analyzed.

In various embodiments, static analysis of a sample is omitted or isperformed by a separate entity, as applicable. As one example,traditional static and/or dynamic analysis may be performed on files bya first entity. Once it is determined (e.g., by the first entity) that agiven file is malicious, the file can be provided to a second entity(e.g., the operator of security platform 122) specifically foradditional analysis with respect to the malware's use of networkactivity (e.g., by a dynamic analysis engine 310).

The environment used by analysis system 300 is instrumented/hooked suchthat behaviors observed while the application is executing are logged asthey occur (e.g., using a customized kernel that supports hooking andlogcat). Network traffic associated with the emulator is also captured(e.g., using pcap). The log/network data can be stored as a temporaryfile on analysis system 300, and can also be stored more permanently(e.g., using HDFS or another appropriate storage technology orcombinations of technology, such as MongoDB). The dynamic analysisengine (or another appropriate component) can compare the connectionsmade by the sample to lists of domains, IP addresses, etc. (314) anddetermine whether the sample has communicated (or attempted tocommunicate) with malicious entities.

As with the static analysis engine, the dynamic analysis engine storesthe results of its analysis in database 316 in the record associatedwith the application being tested (and/or includes the results in report312 as applicable). In some embodiments, the dynamic analysis enginealso forms a verdict with respect to the application (e.g., “safe,”“suspicious,” or “malicious”). As one example, the verdict can be“malicious” if even one “malicious” action is taken by the application(e.g., an attempt to contact a known malicious domain is made, or anattempt to exfiltrate sensitive information is observed). As anotherexample, points can be assigned to actions taken (e.g., based onseverity if found; based on how reliable the action is for predictingmalice; etc.) and a verdict can be assigned by dynamic analysis engine310 (or coordinator 304, if applicable) based on the number of pointsassociated with the dynamic analysis results. In some embodiments, afinal verdict associated with the sample is made based on a combinationof report 308 and report 312 (e.g., by coordinator 304).

False Negatives and False Positives

Some types of malware make use of malicious resources in furtherance oftheir malicious activities. Examples of such malicious resources includecommand and control (C&C) servers (e.g., server 150), servers thatfacilitate data exfiltration, phishing sites, and sites hostingmalicious executables (e.g., ransomware or spyware). As mentioned above,both static and dynamic analysis engines can use information about knownmalicious resources in performing their respective analysis, and/orarriving at maliciousness verdicts. Such information (e.g., knownmalicious domains, known malicious IP addresses, known malicious URLs,and/or user agent strings associated with malware) is also referred toherein as a network “indicator of compromise” (IOC).

Unfortunately, the absence (or presence) of network IOCs (e.g., whiledetermining a verdict based on static/dynamic analysis) is not alwaysdispositive of the maliciousness of an application. As one example, somemalware makes malicious use of otherwise popular and benign domains(e.g., pastebin.com). The malware's contacts with such domains (whichmay appear on a whitelist in collection 314), and absence of contactswith other (known malicious) domains, could result in sample analysissystem 300 erroneously returning a verdict of “not malicious” (i.e., afalse negative result). As a second example, a benign application canerroneously be classified as malicious (i.e., a false positive result)where the benign application makes use of a shared (or recycled) domain,IP address, or other resource that (coincidentally) is also used formalicious purposes. Further, there are some situations (e.g., serviceprobing activities and/or denial of service attack activities) thattraditional IOCs do not cover.

Using techniques described herein, actions taken by known maliciousapplications (e.g., network activity or other activities) are profiled,and used to generate corresponding malware profiles. Malware profilescan be used in a variety of beneficial ways. As a first example, malwareprofiles can be used to complement the analysis (e.g., as describedabove) performed by static analysis engine 306 and dynamic analysisengine 310, helping to minimize false negatives and false positives inverdicts. As a second example, malware profiles can be provided tofirewalls, intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, orother appropriate appliances. In the event a client device protected bysuch an appliance performs actions that match a malware profile (e.g.,within a threshold amount), such behavior can be treated assuspicious/malicious by the appliance, and remedial actions can betaken. As a third example, malware profiles can be provided to endpointprotection applications (e.g., installed on client device 110), whichcan monitor client activities for matches against such profiles.

Malware Profiles

FIGS. 4A-4C depict, respectively, malware profiles that correspond toSarodip, Allaple, and VTBoss. The profiles describe (in an appropriateformat, such as JSON) a sequence of events, and corresponding attributes(e.g., protocol, destination port, host, and/or URL). Each individualevent included in a given profile may appear benign (e.g., contactingtwitter.com). Taken as a whole, however, the combined set of events canbe used to help better identify whether a sample is malicious or not,including by uniquely and exclusively identifying a sample as belongingto a family of malware.

Malware in the Sarodip family (also known by the name “Pidoras”) isresponsible for performing a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attackagainst both the VirusTotal web service, as well as a URL of theattacker's choosing (using a twitter account for command and control).When executed, Sarodip malware makes a request to twitter.com (over port80) for the user, “pidoras6.” The latest tweet from the user (e.g.,“)))))aHR0cHM6Ly93MHJtLmluL2pvaW4vam9pbi5waHA=”) is parsed, removing theleading “)))))” characters, and base64 decoding the remainingcharacters. The resulting URL (e.g., w0rm.in/join/join.php) is used tomake subsequent HTTP requests, which repeat indefinitely. Sarodipmalware also spawns a thread that is responsible for reading itself andmodifying the PE header at offset 68. This provides a unique sample foreach subsequent submission to VirusTotal. It proceeds to submit thisfile to the VirusTotal web service via an HTTP POST request towww.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/file/scan, a process that also repeatsindefinitely. Sarodip also performs encrypted (HTTPS) communications viaTCP.

A malware profile corresponding to Sarodip network traffic is shown inFIG. 4A. In particular, the sequence of network events that make up aSarodip attack are shown in region 402. First (404), an HTTP (406)connection is made via destination port 80 (408) to twitter.com (410),and the user pidoras6's feed is requested (412). Next (414), an HTTPconnection is made via destination port 80 to www.virustotal.comand/vtapi/v2/file/scan is accessed. Sarodip then commences TCP trafficusing destination port 443 (416). As indicated in region 418, events arerequired to occur in the sequence shown in the profile (404, 414, 416)in order for the profile to be matched. Further, the events must all beobserved within a five minute time period (420). In other profiles, theordering of events may not be strictly required, and a value of “false”can be used in a corresponding region 418. And, in other profiles, othertime periods can be specified in corresponding regions 420.

Allaple is a network worm that tries to spread to WINDOWS file sharesusing a list of pre-defined logins and passwords, and then launchestargeted DDoS attacks. A malware profile corresponding to Allaplenetwork traffic is shown in FIG. 4B. In particular, the sequence ofnetwork events that make up an Allaple attack are shown in region 424.First (426), ICMP is used to ping potential victims. Then (428), a datastream is sent to a remote address via port 138. During an Allapleattack, data streams are also sent to remote addresses via port 445(430), and to remote addresses via port 9988 (432). As with Sarodip,events must occur in the order shown in the Allaple profile, and thespecified set of events must be observed within a five minute window, inorder for network activity to be considered a match with the profileshown in FIG. 4B. In various embodiments, additional types of events areincluded in a malware profile. Using the Allaple profile as an example,one additional action taken by Allaple malware is to attempt to writeWINDOWS\system32\urdvxc.exe. Such an action (also referred to herein asa local action) can also be included in the Allaple profile accordingly(e.g., as an event occurring prior to event 426). Other examples oflocal actions (which can be included in a malware profile) includeperforming code injection, modifying a registry, attempts atself-deletion, and attempts to perform encryption operations on files.

Malware in the VTBoss family was designed to perform a DDoS attackagainst the VirusTotal web service. The malware begins by taking an MD5hash of itself and sending the information tohttp://vtboss.yolox.net/md5.php via an HTTP POST request. Itsubsequently enters an infinite loop where it (as with Sarodip) readsitself and modifies the PE header at offset 68, then sends the resultingfile to the VirusTotal web service via an HTTP POST request towww.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/file/scan.

A malware profile corresponding to the VTBoss family of malware is shownin FIG. 4C. In particular, the sequence of network events that make up aVTBoss attack are shown in region 434. First (436), an HTTP connectionis made via destination port 80 to vtboss.yolox.net and/md5.php isaccessed. Then (438), an HTTP connection is made via destination port 80to www.virustotal.com and/vtapi/v2/file/scan is accessed. As indicatedin region 440, events are required to occur in the sequence shown in theprofile in order for the profile to be matched. Further, the events mustboth be observed within a one minute time period (442).

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a process for building a malwareprofile. In various embodiments, process 500 is performed by malwareprofiler 318, for a piece of known malware 320. One example way toimplement malware profiler 318 is using a script (or set of scripts)authored in an appropriate scripting language (e.g., Python). Process500 begins at 502 when data associated with the execution of a malwaresample is received. As previously explained, database 316 (e.g., aMongoDB database) includes a variety of information about malware suchas malware 320, including information obtained during dynamic analysis.Database 316 also includes similar information about benign samples.

As one example of processing that can be performed at 502, malwareprofiler 318 accesses database 316 and obtains a raw network trace formalware 320 (e.g., recorded during dynamic analysis). The raw networkpackets are parsed (e.g., using the dpkt Python module) and aggregatedby malware profiler 318 into request-response pairs (roundtrip). Thepairs are then merged into a series of network activities by correlatingthe pairs' source IP/port and destination IP/port. One example of anetwork activity (NA) is using the HTTP protocol to accesstwitter.com/pidoras6 on the destination port 80. A formal way to definea particular NA is using a four-tuple of attributes: NA=<protocol,destination port, HTTP host, HTTP URI>. Other types of information canalso be included in the definition of an NA in addition to/instead ofthe four attributes listed above. As one example, a profile couldfurther include user agent (e.g., in the case of HTTP traffic), numberof packets sent/received, size of each packet sent/received, and/ortraffic direction. Generally, the more attributes that are included inthe malware profile, the more accurate the profile will be at uniquelydescribing a piece of malware (helping avoid false positive matchesagainst benign application behaviors). However, a strict profile (e.g.,comprising more attributes than the four-tuple described above) may beless likely to match new variants of a piece of malware. A raw profile(P) can be constructed (504) using a sequence of network activities:P=NA1, NA2, NA3, etc.

In some cases, the raw profile will include network activity that occurscoincident to the execution of malware 320. For example, system levelactivities (such as WINDOWS synchronizing a clock) may also result innetwork activities included in the raw profile. At 506, the raw profileis filtered to help ensure that a malware profile uniquely representsthe characteristics of a given piece of malware. In various embodiments,such filtering includes removing network activities associated with NTP,NETBIOS, and IGMP.

At 508, one or more assessments of the filtered profile are performed todetermine whether the profile sufficiently uniquely describes themalware sample's activities. One example of such an assessment that canbe performed at 508 is to determine whether the filtered profile matchesany existing malware profiles (e.g., already present in database 316).If so, this can indicate that the malware (e.g., malware 320) belongs toa family of samples, which exhibit identical (or similar) behaviorsduring execution. If the filtered profile matches a profile associatedwith a malware family, the malware can be associated (e.g., in database316) with other samples belonging to the family. For efficiency, duringenforcement, a single profile (or reduced set of profiles) for thefamily can be used to help detect whether a sample is malicious (i.e.,is a member of the family).

A family match can be strict (i.e., the filtered profile must exactlymatch the profile for a family in order to be considered a match). Afamily match can also be fuzzy, subject to a tolerance. As one example,some variants in the Allaple family of malware may perform each ofactions 428, 430, and 432. Other variants in the Allaple family mayperform actions 428 and 430 without performing action 432. In someembodiments, a single malware profile for the Allaple family is storedin database 316, which indicates that action 432 is optional. In otherembodiments, database 316 can include two profiles for the Allaplefamily—one which includes action 432 and one which does not.

Another example of an assessment that can be performed at 508 is toperform a regression test using the filtered profile and historicalpcaps for the samples stored in database 316. As previously mentioned,database 316 includes static/dynamic analysis reports on both benignsamples and malicious samples. If applying the filtered profile to thehistorical pcaps results in more than a threshold number of falsepositives (e.g., 3% or more of the matches made by the profile are pcapsof benign samples), the filtered profile is likely not suitable for use,and process 500 terminates early, as applicable (without storing thefiltered profile as a malware profile).

At 510, the filtered, validated malware profile for malware 320 isstored. In some embodiments, the profile is stored in database 316. Inaddition (or, in various embodiments, instead), the malware profile canalso be inserted into another storage. As one example, each networkactivity can be broken into a key-value pair, and stored in a pluggablebackend key-value pair store (e.g., Redis store 322), for faster lookupsduring real-time analysis of samples.

Using Malware Profiles

As mentioned above, malware profiles can be used in a variety ofbeneficial ways. As a first example, malware profiles can be used tocomplement the static/dynamic analysis performed by sample analysissystem 300. As a second example, malware profiles can be used byappliances/endpoints (e.g., for forensic analysis and/or endpointprotection).

Example—Identifying Malicious Applications

FIG. 6 illustrates an embodiment of a process for determining whether asample is malicious. In various embodiments, process 600 is performed bysample analysis system 300. The process begins at 602 when a potentiallymalicious sample is executed. As one example of the processing performedat 602, dynamic analysis engine 310 executes a sample (such as sample130). Activities that occur during execution of the sample are recorded.As mentioned above, network traffic (e.g., as pcap data) is an exampleof data that is recorded at 602.

At 604, pattern extractor 324 extracts activities from the informationrecorded at 602 and generates an activity pattern. One way to implementpattern extractor 324 is using a script (or set of scripts) authored inan appropriate scripting language (e.g., Python). In variousembodiments, pattern extractor 324 generates the activity pattern byperforming portions of process 502-506 of process 500 (e.g., using thepcap data obtained at 602 and other information as applicable, such asfile writes and reads).

At 606, pattern extractor 324 compares the extracted pattern (for thesample) against malware profiles (e.g., previously stored in database316 and/or store 322 in accordance with process 500). In particular,pattern extractor 324 searches store 322 for the pattern extracted at604. The comparison performed at 606 can be strict, requiring an exactmatch between the sample's pattern and a malware profile in store 322.The comparison performed at 606 can also be fuzzy. As one example, afuzzy match could require that at least 85% of the activities be matchedbetween the sample's pattern and a malware profile in order for a matchto be found. As another example, a fuzzy match could require that thesame activities occur in both the sample's pattern and a malwareprofile, but may occur in a different order. As yet another example, afuzzy match could allow for a less than exact match of one or moreattributes, such as a single port number in a single activity beingdifferent between the two (but otherwise requiring an exact match).

At 608, a verdict is assigned to the sample. As previously explained, invarious embodiments, static analysis engine 306 and dynamic analysisengine 310 (and/or coordinator 304) form one or more verdicts withrespect to the maliciousness of a given sample. Pattern extractor 324can similarly determine a verdict for the sample (which can be used as afactor in determining a final verdict, or, as applicable, can controlthe final verdict). Pattern extractor 324 can also provide its verdictto dynamic analysis engine 310, which can use pattern extractor 324'sverdict as one of its own factors in determining a verdict for thesample. If a match was found at 606 (between the sample's pattern and amalware profile stored in store 322), pattern extractor 324 can assign averdict of “malicious” for the sample. Additional information can alsobe returned with a malicious verdict, such as an MD5 or other identifierof the malware whose profile was matched by the sample's pattern, anymalware family information associated with the matched malware, etc. Ifno such match is found, pattern extractor 324 can assign a verdict of“unknown” (or another appropriate verdict, as applicable).

Example—Forensic/Inline Analysis

Returning to the environment of FIG. 1 , sometimes malware, such asmalware 130, will successfully penetrate network 140. One reason forthis is where data appliance 102 operates on a “first-time allow”principle. Suppose that when an appliance, such as data appliance 102,submits a sample to security platform 122, it takes security platform122 approximately fifteen minutes to return a verdict to data appliance102 (whether “benign,” “malicious,” “unknown,” etc.). Instead ofblocking communications between system 120 and client device 104 duringthat fifteen minute time period, under a first-time allow principle, thecommunication is allowed. When a verdict is returned (e.g., fifteenminutes later), data appliance 102 can use the verdict (e.g.,“malicious”) to block subsequent transmissions of malware 130 to network140, can block communications between system 120 and network 140, etc.Unfortunately, during the fifteen minutes data appliance 102 awaits averdict from security platform 122, a user of client device 104 couldhave executed malware 130, potentially causing the propagation ofmalware 130 to other nodes in network 140 (e.g., to client device 106).Another example way that malware such as malware 130 could penetratenetwork 140 is due to lateral movement (e.g., where the malware wasinstalled on a node via an infected USB drive, where the malware doesnot propagate through the firewall, etc.).

Data appliance 102 maintains a set of logs (e.g., a traffic log thatlogs connection information for network 140, and a URL log that logsURLs requested by clients such as clients 104-110). Using techniquesdescribed herein, malware profiles can be used to assist in analysis ofsuch logs, and can help identify and mitigate damage caused by allowingmalware (e.g., malware 130) into network 140.

FIG. 7A illustrates an event sequence of data logged by a data appliance(e.g., data appliance 102). In particular, FIG. 7A illustrates log linesfrom a traffic log (e.g., lines 1, 4, and 6), and log lines from a URLlog (e.g., lines 2, 3, and 5). The log data pertains to two differentnodes within a network, hereinafter referred to as “host1” and “host2.”In the example shown in FIG. 7A, suppose that host1 is an uncompromisedclient device, being used (by a user hereinafter referred to as “Alice”)to browse various websites. Further suppose that host2 has beencompromised by a variant of Sarodip. Lines 2, 3, and 6 of FIG. 7Aprovide evidence that host2 has been compromised. In particular, host2accessed www.twitter.com/pidoras6 using HTTP port 80 (704), thenaccessed www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/file/scan also using HTTP port 80(706), and then made an encrypted (HTTPS) communication via TCP (708).

As shown in FIG. 7A, Alice happens to be browsing the VirusTotalwebsite, and the Twitter website, along with other sites. However, asalso shown in FIG. 7A, her benign browsing activities on host1 producelog lines that are significantly different from the log lines producedby compromised host2. In particular, when Alice accesses VirtusTotal,her connection makes use of HTTPS (710), and many different resources(e.g., related to the display of advertisements) are requested by herbrowser in conjunction with her browsing (e.g., 714). Similarly, whenAlice accesses Twitter, her connection makes use of HTTPS (716), andmany different resources (e.g., related to the display of images) arerequested by her browser in conjunction with her browsing (e.g., 712).

FIG. 7B depicts a representation of the event sequence shown in FIG. 7A.Events associated with host1 are depicted, in region 752, as shadedboxes (e.g., box 754) and events associated with host2 are depicted asunshaded boxes (e.g., box 756). In particular, box 754 corresponds toline 1 of the log data shown in FIG. 7A (702)—a UDP connection made byhost1. Box 758 corresponds to line 2 of the log data shown in FIG. 7A(and, line 404 of the Sarodip malware profile shown in FIG. 4A). Boxes760, 762, and 764 correspond to the web browsing activities of host1.Box 766 corresponds to line 3 of the log data shown in FIG. 7A (and,line 414 of the Sarodip malware profile shown in FIG. 4A). Box 768corresponds to line 4 of the log data shown in FIG. 7A (and is notrelevant to the Sarodip malware profile). Finally, box 770 correspondsto line 6 of the log data shown in FIG. 7A.

A match can be performed using malware profile 4A, on a host by hostbasis, against the log entries shown in FIG. 7A. In various embodiments,a match of subsequence is used (e.g., to take into account that a givenhost will likely engage in multiple activities in parallel, at leastsome of which are likely unrelated to potential compromise). A slidingwindow (772) of five minutes is used when performing the matching, inaccordance with the time window specified at 420 in the Sarodip malwareprofile. Performing such a match will identify that host2 has beencompromised by Sarodip. A variety of actions can be taken in response tosuch a determination, such as quarantining the compromised host fromcommunicating with other nodes within enterprise network 140, alertingan administrator, etc.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example of a process for using a malware profileto identify a compromised host. In various embodiments, process 800 isperformed by data appliance 102, and in particular by malware analysismodule 112. Malware analysis module 112 can be implemented using ascript (or set of scripts) authored in an appropriate scripting language(e.g., Python). In various embodiments, process 800 is performed as athird party service (e.g., where data appliance 102 provides its logs tosecurity platform 122 for analysis). Process 800 can also be performedon an endpoint, such as client device 104 (e.g., by an endpointprotection application executing on client device 104).

Process 800 begins at 802 when a malware profile is received. A malwareprofile can be received at 802 in response to a variety of actions. Asone example, an administrator (e.g., of data appliance 102) can providea malware profile (e.g., malware profile 4A) to data appliance 102 inconjunction with an audit or other explicit inquiry about whether anynodes in network 140 might be compromised by Sarodip. As anotherexample, data appliance 102 can receive a malware profile at 802 as partof a regular content update (e.g., along with one or more other malwareprofiles). As yet another example, data appliance 102 can receive amalware profile at 802 when data appliance 102 receives a verdict (e.g.,about malware 130, after security platform 122 completes its analysis).

At 804, a set of logs is analyzed for entries that match the malwareprofile. As applicable, malware analysis module 112 can join multipleindividual logs (e.g., a traffic log and a URL log) in RAM prior toanalyzing the set of logs. Similarly, where it is desired to examinelonger periods of log data, multiple logs of the same type (e.g., atraffic log for January 1-7 and a traffic log for January 8-14) can bejoined. The analysis performed at 804 can be triggered by an event(e.g., receipt of the profile or receipt of an instruction provided byan administrator to begin analysis). The analysis performed at 804 canalso be performed periodically (e.g., daily or weekly).

Finally, at 806, in the event a set of log entries is found to match themalware profile, the host implicated in the log entries is determined tobe compromised. As mentioned above, a variety of remedial actions can betaken in response to a determination that the host has been compromised,such as quarantining the host from communicating with other nodes withinenterprise network 140, alerting an administrator, etc.

Although the foregoing embodiments have been described in some detailfor purposes of clarity of understanding, the invention is not limitedto the details provided. There are many alternative ways of implementingthe invention. The disclosed embodiments are illustrative and notrestrictive.

What is claimed is:
 1. A system, comprising: a processor configured to:execute a potentially malicious sample and record one or more networkactivities associated with the executing of the potentially malicioussample; compare at least some of the recorded network activities to apreviously generated malware profile, wherein the malware profilecomprises a set of network activities taken by a known maliciousapplication during execution of the known malicious application, andwherein the malware profile was previously validated, at least in part,by determining a false positive score when compared against historicalpcap traffic; and assign a malicious verdict to the potentiallymalicious sample based at least in part on a determination that therecorded network activities match the malware profile; and a memorycoupled to the processor and configured to provide the processor withinstructions.
 2. The system of claim 1, wherein the malware profile isgenerated at least in part by abstracting a capture of network activityassociated with the execution of the known malicious application intothe set of network activities taken by the known malicious application.3. The system of claim 2, wherein abstracting the capture of networkactivity includes aggregating raw network packets into request-responsepairs.
 4. The system of claim 1, wherein at least one network activityincluded in the set of network activities taken by the known maliciousapplication comprises service probing.
 5. The system of claim 1, whereinat least one network activity included in the set of network activitiestaken by the known malicious application comprises a denial of serviceactivity.
 6. The system of claim 1, wherein the malware profile furthercomprises a set of local actions taken by the known maliciousapplication.
 7. The system of claim 1, wherein the match determinationcomprises an exact match between the malware profile and an activitypattern associated with the potentially malicious sample.
 8. The systemof claim 1, wherein the match determination comprises a fuzzy matchbetween the malware profile and an activity pattern associated with thepotentially malicious sample, wherein at least one attribute included inthe malware profile has a different value from a corresponding attributein the activity pattern.
 9. The system of claim 1, wherein the matchdetermination comprises a fuzzy match between the malware profile and anactivity pattern associated with the potentially malicious sample,wherein at least one activity included in the malware profile occurs inan order that is different from a corresponding activity in the activitypattern.
 10. The system of claim 1, wherein the match determinationcomprises a fuzzy match between the malware profile and an activitypattern associated with the potentially malicious sample, wherein atleast one activity included in the activity pattern is not present inthe malware profile.
 11. The system of claim 1, wherein the malwareprofile corresponds to a malware family and wherein the known maliciousapplication shares the malware profile with a plurality of maliciousapplications that are members of the malware family.
 12. A method,comprising: executing a potentially malicious sample and recording oneor more network activities associated with the executing of thepotentially malicious sample; comparing at least some of the recordednetwork activities to a previously generated malware profile, whereinthe malware profile comprises a set of network activities taken by aknown malicious application during execution of the known maliciousapplication, and wherein the malware profile was previously validated,at least in part, by determining a false positive score when comparedagainst historical pcap traffic; and assigning a malicious verdict tothe potentially malicious sample based at least in part on adetermination that the recorded network activities match the malwareprofile.
 13. The method of claim 12, wherein the malware profile isgenerated at least in part by abstracting a capture of network activityassociated with the execution of the known malicious application intothe set of network activities taken by the known malicious application.14. The method of claim 13, wherein abstracting the capture of networkactivity includes aggregating raw network packets into request-responsepairs.
 15. The method of claim 12, wherein at least one network activityincluded in the set of network activities taken by the known maliciousapplication comprises service probing.
 16. The method of claim 12,wherein at least one network activity included in the set of networkactivities taken by the known malicious application comprises a denialof service activity.
 17. The method of claim 12, wherein the malwareprofile further comprises a set of local actions taken by the knownmalicious application.
 18. The method of claim 12, wherein the matchdetermination comprises an exact match between the malware profile andan activity pattern associated with the potentially malicious sample.19. The method of claim 12, wherein the match determination comprises afuzzy match between the malware profile and an activity patternassociated with the potentially malicious sample, wherein at least oneattribute included in the malware profile has a different value from acorresponding attribute in the activity pattern.
 20. The method of claim12, wherein the match determination comprises a fuzzy match between themalware profile and an activity pattern associated with the potentiallymalicious sample, wherein at least one activity included in the malwareprofile occurs in an order that is different from a correspondingactivity in the activity pattern.
 21. The method of claim 12, whereinthe match determination comprises a fuzzy match between the malwareprofile and an activity pattern associated with the potentiallymalicious sample, wherein at least one activity included in the activitypattern is not present in the malware profile.
 22. The method of claim12, wherein the malware profile corresponds to a malware family andwherein the known malicious application shares the malware profile witha plurality of malicious applications that are members of the malwarefamily.
 23. A computer program product embodied in a non-transitorycomputer readable storage medium and comprising computer instructionsfor: executing a potentially malicious sample and recording one or morenetwork activities associated with the executing of the potentiallymalicious sample; comparing at least some of the recorded networkactivities to a previously generated malware profile, wherein themalware profile comprises a set of network activities taken by a knownmalicious application during execution of the known maliciousapplication, and wherein the malware profile was previously validated,at least in part, by determining a false positive score when comparedagainst historical pcap traffic; and assigning a malicious verdict tothe potentially malicious sample based at least in part on adetermination that the recorded network activities match the malwareprofile.